Chapter 4: The Swedish Model by Lars Calmfors et al.




During the current economic crisis Sweden has stood
out from other EU countries thanks to its strong pub-
lic finances. At the trough of the recession in 2009
Sweden had the smallest fiscal deficit of all EU coun-
tries: only 0.9 percent of GDP. In 2011 there was even
a (small) fiscal surplus. Sweden is one of the three
member states that have never violated the deficit
and/or debt criteria in the stability pact (the other two
are Estonia and Luxembourg).2
This chapter tries to explain the strong performance
of public finances in Sweden and looks at what
lessons for other countries can be drawn. Section 4.2
reviews the development of public finances over
time. Section 4.3 begins by surveying the research
on why fiscal policy in modern democracies may be
subject to a deficit bias and then discusses how the
fiscal framework established in Sweden may have
helped to contain such tendencies. The importance
of output growth to fiscal consolidation is high-
lighted in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 sums up the con-
clusions. 
4.2 Development of public finances over time
To what extent does Sweden's comparably
favourable fiscal balance depend on stronger public
finances before the crisis and to what extent on the
performance during the crisis? The two last columns
in Table 4.1 break down the differences in govern-
ment net lending between Sweden and other coun-
tries in 2011 into contributions from (1) differences
in government net lending in 2007 and (2) differ-
ences in the development of government net lend-
ing during 2007–2011. The table shows that the
main explanation of why the public finances are
currently stronger in Sweden than elsewhere is the
stronger position already before the crisis. The dif-
ference in government net lending between Sweden
and the euro area as a whole in 2007, for example,
accounted for as much as 4.3 percentage points of
the 4.7 percentage points difference in 2011.3
Greece, Portugal, Italy and Germany all had small-
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Table 4.1 
Government net lending in Sweden and other EU countries as a percentage of GDP 



















change in net 
lending  
2007–2011 
Sweden  – 0.6       3.6       – 3.0                            
Euro area  – 4.1      – 0.7       – 3.4        – 4.7        – 4.3        – 0.4 
France  – 5.9      – 2.8       – 3.1      – 6.5        – 6.4        – 0.1 
Germany  – 1.3       0.2     – 1.5      – 1.9        – 3.4        1.5 
Greece  – 8.9  – 6.8       – 2.1  – 9.5  – 10.4        – 0.9 
Ireland  – 10.3      0.1  – 10.4      – 10.9      – 3.5        – 7.4 
Italy  – 3.8      – 1.6  – 2.2        – 4.4        – 5.2       0.8 
Portugal  – 5.8      – 3.2  – 2.6        – 6.4        – 6.8         0.4 
Spain  – 6.6       1.9    – 8.5  – 7.2        – 1.7         – 5.5 
Source: European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2011, European Commission. 
 
1 We are grateful to Anna Larsson and Joakim Sonnegård for their
helpful comments on the chapter.
2 The deficit criterion is that the fiscal deficit shall not exceed three
percent of GDP. The debt criterion is that consolidated government
gross debt shall not exceed 60 percent of GDP or that, if it does, it
should be approaching the debt limit "at a satisfactory pace" (which
means that it must be falling at the very least). See Calmfors and
Wren-Lewis (2011).
3 The exceptions to this pattern concern the comparisons to Ireland
and Spain, which both had fiscal surpluses in 2007, but then suffered
huge deteriorations when the unsustainable booms in both countries
came to an abrupt end. er deteriorations than Sweden
in government net lending
2007–2011.
4.2.1 Long-term developments of
public finances 
Figure 4.1 shows the develop-
ment of government net lending
in Sweden. There have been large
swings in fiscal outcomes, espe-
cially before 2000. The large fluc-
tuations have to a large extent
depended on strong automatic
stabilisers, associated with a high
ratio of government expenditure
to GDP (see Section 4.2.2).
In the first half of the 1990s
Sweden suffered a deep economic crisis similar to
those currently occurring in Ireland and Spain.
Credit market deregulation in the mid-1980s was
followed by rapid credit expansion, which led to a
price bubble for both private and commercial prop-
erty. The bubble burst in the early 1990s and result-
ed in a serious banking crisis, which coincided in
time with a deep international downturn. The large
real appreciation that had taken place during the
preceding boom when wages and prices rose faster
than abroad, at the same time as the exchange rate
was held fixed (first to a currency basket and then to
the ecu), contributed to a fall in exports. The result
was a deep recession, with GDP falling for three
consecutive years (representing a total decrease of
around five percent) and unemployment rising from
a trough of two percent in 1990 to eleven percent in
1993.4 The result for public finances was a deficit of
11.2 percent of GDP in 1993.
The combination of large fiscal deficits and nega-
tive growth led to a rapid build-up of government
debt (see Figure 4.2). Consolidated government
gross debt increased from 41.2 percent of GDP in
1990 to 73.3 percent in 1996. The government net
financial position went from a positive net finan-
cial worth of 8.0 percent of GDP in 1990 to net
debt of 26.6 percent in 1996. This gave rise to seri-
ous doubts about Sweden’s ability to service its
debt in the financial markets, leading to the devel-
opment of a large long-term
interest rate differential vis-à-
vis Germany (Figure 4.3).
The Social Democratic govern-
ment that took office in Sweden
in 1994 launched a tough fiscal
consolidation programme, which
continued the consolidation
efforts started in 1992/1993 by
the then Liberal-Conservative
government. The programme was
unconditional, in other words a










Note: EU-8 is a weighted average for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook No. 89 (Sweden); and Ameco and own calculations (EU-8).







Consolidated government gross debt
General government net debt
Government debt in Sweden
% of GDP
Note: Consolidated government gross debt (Maastricht debt) is defined as the general government total debt after 
internal claims and liabilities in the sector have been netted out. General government net debt is the sector's gross 
financial debt minus the sum of its financial assets, including both claims by one part of the government sector on 
other parts of it and claims on the private sector. The large difference between consolidated government gross debt 
and general government net debt depends mainly on large claims on the private sector held by the public pension 
system.
Sources: Ameco (consolidated government gross debt) and OECD Economic Outlook No. 89 (general government 
net debt).
Figure 4.2
4 See, for example, Jonung and Hagberg
(2005), Jonung et al. (2009) and Fiscal
Policy Council (2010, 2011) for analyses
of Sweden’s 1990s crisis. A thorough
analysis was also provided in Swedish
Parliament (2001).EEAG Report 2012 101
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path for the fiscal deficit to be achieved irrespective of
macroeconomic developments was set out. The pro-
gramme's objectives were a fiscal deficit of below
three percent of GDP in 1997 and a balanced budget
in 1998. Figure 4.1 shows that these objectives were
met; the fiscal situation improved even faster than
scheduled.5 This improvement continued until 2000,
by which time a fiscal surplus of 3.6 percent of GDP
had been achieved. The fiscal balance deteriorated
again during the downturn of 2001–2003, but the
emerging deficits were small. As of 2004 fiscal sur-
pluses were achieved once again, which rose continu-
ously up until 2007, when the surplus returned to the
level of 3.6 percent of GDP.
The consolidation programme in the 1990s was
rather evenly split between de  -
creases in government expendi-
ture and increases in government
revenues.6 Looking at ratios to
GDP, the revenue ratio fell some-
what over the 1993–2000 period,
while the ratio of government
expenditure to GDP was re  duced
substantially from 71.7 percent
in 1993 to 55.1 in 2000 (Fi  -
gure 4.4). The in  crease in GDP
when growth picked up again
after the crisis in the first half of
the 1990s was of key im  portance
to these developments (see Sec  -
tion 4.4.1).
A key contributing factor to suc-
cessful fiscal consolidation was
that the costs of supporting fail-
ing banks in 1992–93 turned out
to be small in the end. The total
direct net cost to tax payers was
estimated at around two percent
of GDP in 1997. This is ex  -
plained by the fact that the gov-
ernment largely followed a policy
of injecting capital only in
exchange for equity or other
assets (mainly commercial prop-
erty) that could later be sold off
under favourable terms.7
The development of the fiscal
balance is reflected in the devel-
opment of the government debt
ratio. Figure 4.2 shows a trend towards a reduction of
both consolidated gross debt and net debt. From its
peak of 73.3 percent of GDP in 1996, consolidated
gross debt fell to 36.9 percent at the end of 2011.
Government net debt was negative as of 2004, in other
words the general government sector had a positive
net financial worth from that time on. At the end of
2011 general government net financial worth amount-
ed to 25 percent of GDP. 
A frequently used measure of fiscal sustainability is









Interest rate differential between Sweden and Germany
on ten-year government bonds
Percentage points











Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 89.
General government revenues and expenditures in Sweden
Figure 4.4
5 See Henriksson (2007) for an account of
the consolidation programme.
6 Henriksson (2007) and Bergman (2010).
7 See Jennergren and Näslund (1997) and Englund (1999). In 1992
the Swedish government issued a blanket guarantee for all bank
debt, which helped contain the banking crisis, but ultimately only
had to be met to a small degree.EU member states by the European Commission.8
The indicator measures the permanent change in
structural (cyclically adjusted) primary net lending as
a percentage of GDP necessary for the government to
comply with its intertemporal budget constraint,
according to which future primary fiscal surpluses
(revenue less expenditure excluding interest payments)
must be at least as large as the outstanding debt. The
estimated future primary surpluses are based on
assumptions of unchanged tax and expenditure rules
and on demographic projections. This metric also
confirms the picture of strong public finances in
Sweden as compared to most
other EU member states (Ta  -
ble 4.2). The S2 indicator is 1.8
for Sweden versus an (un  -
weighted) average of 7.8 for the
European Union as a whole,
using the actual situation in 2010
as the benchmark in this calcula-
tion. If the comparison is instead
made with the plans in the con-
vergence and stability pro-
grammes presented to the Ecofin
Council, the Swedish figure is 1.0
and the European average 6.4.
According to the first calculation
Sweden comes third among the
EU countries (after Hungary and
Estonia), while according to the
second calculation Sweden ranks
first. 
The favourable development of
public finances in Sweden has
closed the interest rate gap to
Germany (Figure 4.3), a devel-
opment which was seen as highly
unlikely in the mid-1990s. The
yield on ten-year government
bonds is now (January 2012)
even lower in Sweden than in
Ger many.
4.2.2 Fiscal developments during
the economic crisis
The size of automatic stabilisers
is closely related to government
expenditure as a share of GDP. If taxes are propor-
tional to GDP and all government expenditure is
independent of GDP, the budget elasticity (more
specifically the semi-elasticity of the fiscal balance
with respect to GDP, or the percentage point change
of the fiscal balance relative to GDP when there is a
one percent change in GDP) equals the ratio of gov-
ernment expenditure to GDP.9 Figure 4.5 also shows
a strong relationship between the budget elasticity
estimated by the OECD and the government expendi-
ture-to-GDP ratio. From this graph, one should have
expected a larger fiscal deterioration in Sweden than
EEAG Report 2012 102
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Table 4.2  
The European Commission’s S2 indicator 
 2010  Scenario  Programme 
scenario 
Belgium  6.4               6.6 
Bulgaria  4.0               2.4 
Czech Republic  8.1               6.9 
Denmark  3.1               3.4 
Germany  5.7               4.2 
Estonia  1.3               1.7 
Ireland  15.9             12.4 
Greece  15.8             12.5 
Spain  12.4               9.0 
France  5.7               4.0 
Italy  2.8               2.0 
Cyprus 12.8  12.3 
Latvia 6.7  7.7 
Lithuania 9.8  9.2 
Luxembourg 13.3  12.9 
Hungary 0.6  4.7 
Malta 8.0  6.9 
Netherlands 8.9  6.1 
Austria 5.3  4.7 
Poland 5.5  3.4 
Portugal 8.8  3.6 
Romania 10.3  6.4 
Slovenia 11.6  11.2 
Slovakia 10.9  7.3 
Finland 5.3  4.0 
Sweden 1.8  1.0 
United Kingdom  10.6  6.8 
Unweighted average  7.8  6.4 
Note: The S2 indicator gives the permanent increase in government 
structural primary net lending as a percentage of GDP required to meet 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, that is the condition 
that future predicted primary surpluses (given unchanged tax and 
expenditure rules and a demographic projection) at least equal the 
current debt stock. The 2010 scenario gives the change relative to the 
actual position in that year, whereas the programme scenario gives the 
change relative to plans up to 2014 in the countries’ stability and 
convergence programmes.  
Source: Public Finances in EMU 2011, European Commission.  
8 See, for example, European Commission (2010). The S2 indicator
has been extensively analysed in Fiscal Policy Council (2009, 2010,
2011).
9 See, for example, Gàli (1994), Girouard and André (2005) and
Flodén (2009).EEAG Report 2012 103
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in the euro area during the 2008–2009 recession as
GDP fell more. Instead, however, the opposite
occurred. 
One explanation is that the OECD is likely to have
overestimated the size of automatic stabilisers in
Sweden. The OECD does not take into account that
local governments in Sweden now operate under a
balanced budget requirement (see Section 4.3.2),
which they also seem to respect. This means that local
government expenditure is not independent of GDP.
Instead, when GDP falls, and thus the tax revenues of
local governments also decrease, the latter are forced
to cut their expenditure. As local government expen-
diture amounts to over 20 percent of GDP, this means
that the budget elasticity calculated by the OECD
should be adjusted downwards by approximately as
many percentage points. Hence, the general govern-
ment fiscal balance is much less sensitive to GDP falls
than indicated by the OECD estimate.10
Another explanation of the small deterioration in the
fiscal balance in Sweden in 2008–2011 is that discre-
tionary fiscal policy did not follow its usual counter-
cyclical pattern. There was much less fiscal stimulus
during the downturn than there would have been if
earlier policy patterns had been followed.11
Sweden's strong fiscal performance in recent years
reflects labour market reforms to a certain degree. The
primary economic-policy objective of the Liberal-
Conservative government that took office in 2006 was
to raise employment, which had
not returned to pre-1990s crisis
levels. To this end the government
started to implement far-reaching
reforms before the downturn in
2008–2009. Eligibility for sick-
ness insurance and early retire-
ment was severely restricted
along with eligibility for unem-
ployment insurance. Unemploy  -
ment benefit replacement rates
and compensation replacement
rates in labour market pro-
grammes were also reduced.
Together, these changes have had
a direct mechanical strengthening
effect on the fiscal balance of
over one percent of GDP (not
taking behavioural effects on the
employment level into account).12
In addition, labour market reforms may have
helped to maintain a high level of employment. The
earlier Okun’s law relationship between employ-
ment and GDP growth broke down in the recession:
in 2008–2009 employment fell much less than it
would have done if it had followed the earlier rela-
tionship between employment and output growth
(Fiscal Policy Council 2010). This helped keep up
tax revenues during the downturn. The reasons for
the limited fall in employment have been much dis-
cussed, but no consensus has been reached on this
point. The labour market reforms described above
and the introduction of an earned income tax cred-
it are potential reasons for this outcome. Such
reforms can reduce the unemployment effects of
macroeconomic disturbances.13 Another possible
explanation is that the 2008–2009 recession was
restricted to the export industry, whereas demand
held up much better in the more labour-intensive
service sector. A related explanation is that the
downturn was mainly regarded by firms as tempo-
rary and resulting from an external shock, which
motivated labour hoarding, rather than as a more
permanent downturn resulting from structural
weaknesses in the domestic economy (as in the
1990s). In addition, firms probably had much more
slimmed-down organisations than previously,
which made them more inclined to keep staff in


















































Public expenditure, % of GDP
Note: The budget elasticity measures the percentage points change in government net lending in per cent of GDP 
when there is a one per cent change in GDP. Public expenditure refers to the total of all public sector expenditures 
in % of GDP in 2005.
Sources: Girouard and André (2005) and OECD (2008).
Budget elasticity and size of the public sector
Figure 4.5
10 Fiscal Policy Council (2011).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. 
13 The seminal contribution is Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
14 Fiscal Policy Council (2010, 2011).A final explanation of Sweden's recent fiscal perfor-
mance is that no banking crisis, requiring large-scale
government injections of new capital into banks, has
(to date) developed. Swedish banks were not very
highly exposed to the various types of mortgage-
based securities and there have been no large falls in
domestic property prices (although there have been
warnings about inflated house prices from, for exam-
ple, the IMF).15 Swedish banks were, however, heavily
exposed to the Baltic economies due to aggressive
lending and sustained large capital losses there during
their recent recessions, but – with some luck – those
losses were absorbed by the banks themselves and
their shareholders.
4.3 The fiscal framework
4.3.1 Theories of deficit bias and the Swedish case
The general tendency among OECD countries to
accumulate government debt in the 1970s and 1980s
has given rise to a large body of research literature
which claims that unconstrained discretionary fiscal
policy in modern democracies is likely to be subject to
deficit bias, that is to be too expansionary on average.
The explanations put forward partly overlap, but, fol-
lowing Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011), they can be
classified as follows:
1. Informational problems. These may refer to a lack
of understanding among both voters and politi-
cians of the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint. Alternatively, there may be general
over-optimism as stressed by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009). More sophisticated explanations empha-
sise that voters are more ignorant than govern-
ments, making it possible for the latter to exploit
this lack of knowledge and increase their re-elec-
tion chances through expansionary policy before
elections, thus creating a political business cycle. 
2. Impatience. Governments may be discounting the
future at a higher rate than the electorate, because
politicians can lose office in elections. One set of
models stresses political polarisation in a two-
party system where parties are likely to alternate in
power (Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Persson and
Svensson 1989). If the parties have differing pref-
erences regarding the size or type of government
expenditure, a party has an incentive to run a
deficit when in power to favour its constituency
(tax cuts by liberal-conservative governments and
expenditure increases by socialist governments or
increases in the type of expenditure that their own
constituency prefers). Such deficits have the strate-
gic advantage from the point of view of the incum-
bent government of making it more difficult for
the other party when it comes to power in the
future to pursue the interests of its constituency, as
room for fiscal manoeuvre is reduced by the
requirement to service the accumulated debt.
3. Common-pool problems. As government expendi-
ture or tax cuts may favour specific groups, those
groups lobby for these with insufficient regard to
their full budgetary costs both now and in the
future. Hence, policy makers may fail to inter-
nalise the overall costs of deficits, leading to exces-
sive government debt accumulation (von Hagen
and Harden 1995; Hallerberg and von Hagen
1999; Velasco 1999, 2000). Common-pool prob-
lems are likely to be more important if pressure
groups exert a large influence, if governments are
fragmented (coalition governments) and if govern-
ments have weak support in the legislature (minor-
ity governments). Hallerberg and von Hagen
(1999) outline two methods to mitigate common-
pool problems: one is through a strong finance
minister, who keeps spending ministers in check;
the other is through a contract solution, whereby
ministers (coalition parties) ex ante commit to a
common contract on budget discipline.
4. Time inconsistency. It is well-known that uncon-
strained central banks, interested in low unem-
ployment in addition to low inflation, may in a dis-
cretionary setting be subject to inflation bias,
because they have an incentive to try to reduce
unemployment through surprise inflation
(Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon
1983a,b). Similar forces may apply to fiscal policy
and then result in deficit bias (Agell et al. 1996).
The temptation for governments to run deficits for
this reason may have increased as central banks
have become more independent, which has
reduced the inflation bias of monetary policy
(Castellani and Debrun 2005).
In the Swedish context, several of the described
deficit-bias mechanisms are potentially important.
There has been political polarisation regarding the
size of government between a liberal-conservative
bloc and a red-green bloc, which have alternated in
power. Governments have been minority or coalition
governments for decades, and high employment has
been a key economic policy objective. So the impa-
EEAG Report 2012 104
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tience, common-pool and time-inconsistency mecha-
nisms could all be expected to play an important role
under unconstrained discretionary fiscal policy-
making.
4.3.2 Fiscal rules and institutions 
Fiscal rules and fiscal transparency are widely seen as
appropriate constraints to counter deficit bias. The
fiscal crisis in the 1990s helped forge a broad consen-
sus that the fiscal house must be kept in order so that
the country would never end up in a similar situation
again. This consensus has been codified into a strict
fiscal framework. It was established in the late 1990s
as a continuation of the budget consolidation pro-
gramme discussed in Section 4.2.2, and has subse-
quently been successively amended, especially in
recent years.16 The framework consists of the follow-
ing pillars:17
1. A top-down approach for the adoption of the bud-
get in the Parliament. Decisions are taken in two
steps. In a first step, the Parliament decides on
overall expenditure and its allocation between
27 expenditure areas. In a second step, decisions
are taken on individual expenditure items. In this
phase, one form of expenditure cannot be raised
unless another form of expenditure in the same
area is correspondingly reduced. Hence, the deci-
sion on the total expenditure level will not be the
result of a series of uncoordinated individual ex  -
penditure decisions. The two-step budget proce-
dure is well-designed to deal with the common-
pool problems discussed above.
2. A surplus target according to which general gov-
ernment net lending should be one percent of
GDP. To preserve flexibility for fiscal policy, the
target applies over a business cycle. In contrast to
what was the case in the United Kingdom in the
past, and which opened up for manipulations, the
Swedish government does not date the cycle.18
Instead, it evaluates adherence to the target with
the help of several indicators: a backward-looking
average of actual net lending, a – partly – for-
ward-looking average of actual net lending, and
cyclically adjusted net lending (for both individ-
ual years and longer time periods). Initially, it was
not stipulated in the budget law that there should
be a surplus target, but it is as of 2010. The level
of the target is, however, left to discretionary pol-
icy-making. 
3. A ceiling for central government expenditure which
is set at least three years in advance. The ceiling
applies to all central government expenditure
except interest payments. Initially, it was not
mandatory for the government to propose an
expenditure ceiling, although there were regula-
tions on how it should be used if it were decided
(which it has been for every year since 1997). The
stipulations require the government to take action
if the ceiling is in danger of being breached. In
2009 it became mandatory for the government to
propose an expenditure ceiling to the Parliament
in the annual Budget Bill. 
4. A  balanced budget requirement for local govern-
ments (municipalities and counties/regions).19
They must budget for an excess of revenues over
expenditures. If there is a deficit ex post, it must be
compensated for by a surplus within three years.
5. A reformed pension system designed to guarantee
long-term sustainability as contributions, not ben-
efits, are defined. Pensions are indexed to per-capi-
ta wage growth. This could involve sustainability
risks due to unfavourable employment or demo-
graphic developments. To deal with this there is a
balancing mechanism – the brake – which limits
the degree of indexation if the long-run financial
stability of the system is threatened: this occurs if
the capitalised value of contributions plus the
assets in the buffer funds falls below the value of
pension liabilities. The balancing mechanism is
automatic according to a predetermined formula
and does not require any political decisions.20
6. A system for monitoring the government budget
by a number of government agencies.21 These
include the Swedish National Financial Manage  -
ment Authority (which makes budget forecasts),
the  National Institute for Economic Research
(which makes forecasts of macroeconomic devel-
opments, including for public finances) and the
National Audit Office (which in addition to its
main activities evaluates how the fiscal rules have
16 Many of the features of the fiscal framework were first proposed
by the so-called Lindbeck commission (named after its chair, profes-
sor Assar Lindbeck; Ekonomikommissionen 1993), a government
commission given the remit to propose changes in both actual eco-
nomic policy and the economic policy framework during the 1990s
crisis. 
17 See Calmfors (2010, 2011a,b), Fiscal Policy Council (2010, 2011)
and the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill (2010, 2011) for more detailed
accounts of the fiscal framework.
18 See Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011).
19 There is a two-tier structure of local governments in Sweden with
counties responsible for health care and public transports and
municipalities for more local issues. A few counties have been amal-
gamated into larger regions.
20 See EEAG (2007), Chapter 4, and Fiscal Policy Council (2009,
2010).
21 See Calmfors (2010, 2011a,b) and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis
(2011).been respected). In 2007, a Fiscal Policy Council,
consisting of independent (mostly academic)
economists, was set up with the remit of monitor-
ing the sustainability of fiscal policy, the adher-
ence to the surplus target and the expenditure ceil-
ing as well as how fiscal policy relates to the cycle.
In addition, the council is to evaluate employment
policy and the transparency of economic policy.
There are special provisions to safeguard the
council’s independence, such as a stipulation that
the council itself proposes its members to the gov-
ernment.
An interesting question is what motivated the choice
in 1997 of a surplus of one percent of GDP as the fis-
cal target. No convincing motivations were initially
given for that particular choice. Over the years, the
government’s motivations have also shifted (Finans  -
politiska rådet 2008). Recently, the government has
stressed three primary motives: social efficiency (tax
smoothing), intergenerational equity and precaution-
ary considerations. The social-efficiency argument has
been backed up by annual fiscal sustainability calcu-
lations usually showing that, given current expendi-
ture and tax rules and projected demographic devel-
opments, attainment of the one-percent surplus target
will allow (marginal) tax rates to remain constant. In
recent years, the government has placed great empha-
sis on the precautionary motive, arguing that large
safety margins are required to preserve room for fiscal
stimulus in the case of a deep and prolonged reces-
sion, although this argument has never been made
very precise. Nor has a convincing case been made for
why this target would be consistent with intergenera-
tional equity; the Ministry of Finance, for example,
does not publish any generational accounts. 
The overall conclusion is that the government has
never provided a very good explanation of why a sur-
plus of one percent of GDP should be the appropri-
ate fiscal target.22 It was chosen quite arbitrarily in a
situation when the government of the time was look-
ing for a future anchor for fiscal policy after the bud-
get consolidation of the 1990s. A broad consensus on
this target has nevertheless evolved. Although there
has been some critique that the target is too ambitious
(from the left because it is thought to constrain gov-
ernment expenditure and from private business
because it is seen to cause over-taxation), it has not
had a great impact in the public debate. This should
be seen against the background of the deep fiscal cri-
sis in the 1990s, which created a consensus on the mer-
its of a fiscal norm as a way of reducing the risk of
new such crises. It is widely believed that the very exis-
tence of a reasonable norm, rather than its exact for-
mulation, is the key factor (Fiscal Policy Council
2010).
4.3.3 The effects of fiscal rules and transparency
Empirical studies have found that – controlling for
other factors – fiscal rules and fiscal transparency are
associated with favourable fiscal outcomes.23 This
applies especially to rules that combine fiscal balance
targets with expenditure rules as in Sweden. These
studies are, however, plagued by problems of causal-
ity. The question is whether a strict fiscal framework
causes good fiscal outcomes or whether a strict fiscal
framework and good outcomes are both caused by a
third factor, such as a political determination to
avoid future fiscal crises (perhaps resulting from pre-
vious crises). In the latter case, a strict fiscal frame-
work might just be a sign of such determination.
Studies which have taken this causality problem seri-
ously, like Alt and Lassen (2006) and Fabrizio and
Mody (2006), have, however, also found an indepen-
dent effect from the fiscal framework. According to a
recent study, sovereign interest rate spreads to
Germany in the euro area are negatively related to the
stringency of fiscal rules when government deficit
and debt levels are controlled for (Iara and Wolff
2010). This can be interpreted as an indication that
fiscal rules have a credibility effect on sovereign inter-
est rates over and above their effects on (current)
deficits and debts. 
The fiscal rules in Sweden have been judged by the
European Commission in different ways at different
points of time. European Commission (2006) con-
structed an index of the stringency of fiscal rules.
According to this index, Sweden was below the
European median in terms of stringency. However,
according to an updated version of this index in
European Commission (2011), Sweden's fiscal rules
are among the strongest in the European Union
(Figure 4.6). The index is an aggregate measure of the
number of rules, their “bite” and their coverage of
general government finances. The “bite” of each rule
reflects (1) its statutory base; (2) the scope for revising
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22 The sustainability calculations mentioned above should probably
be regarded with healthy scepticism, since it is hard to escape the sus-
picion that assumptions have been chosen to give precisely the result
that the surplus target is consistent with the government’s intertem-
poral budget constraint.
23 See, for example, European Commission (2006), Broesens and
Wierts (2009) and IMF (2009).EEAG Report 2012 107
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objectives; (3) the mechanisms for monitoring compli-
ance with and enforcement of the rule; (4) the exis-
tence of pre-defined enforcement mechanisms; and
(5) the media visibility of the rule.
Alt and Lassen (2006) tried to measure fiscal transparen-
cy rather than the stringency of rules. Their transparen-
cy index is based on the amount and quality of infor-
mation provided and being required by the government
and the existence of independent verification of this
information. Figure 4.7 shows that Sweden scores high
on this measure, although not as high as the Anglo-
Saxon countries Australia, the United Kingdom, the
United States and New Zealand. Alt and Lassen (2006)
and Lassen (2010) find that there is a positive association
between this transparency index and fiscal discipline. 
A related measure to the Alt-
Lassen index has recently been
provided by the European
Commission (2011), which has
constructed an index of the
strength of independent fiscal
watchdogs (fiscal councils) in
the various EU countries. The
analysis considers four areas of
activity: (1) independent analy-
sis of fiscal policy develop-
ments; (2) provision of macro-
economic and/or budgetary
forecasts for budget prepara-
tion; (3) issuing of normative
statements on fiscal policy; and
(4) issuing of recommendations
on the conduct of fiscal policy.
A watchdog is considered
strong  er the more areas of activity it has. The score
also becomes higher (although at a decreasing rate)
if there are more watchdogs. Figure 4.8 shows that
Sweden 2009 scored the highest among the OECD
countries according to this index. This is because
the country was considered to have two such watch-
dogs with all four forms of activity: the Fiscal Policy
Council and the National Institute for Economic
Research.
The degree of adherence to the rules
On the whole, respect for fiscal rules has been high in
Sweden. This does not mean that it has been perfect.
Formally, the central government expenditure ceiling
introduced in 1997 has never
been breached. However, creative
accounting to circumvent the
ceiling has been used. The Social
Democratic governments in par-
ticular, which held office until
2006, made extensive use of tax
expenditure, that is selective tax
cuts (regarding payroll taxes for
local governments only, for
example, when hiring long-term
unemployed) in  stead of expendi-
ture increases.24 Both the previ-
ous Social Democratic govern-
ment and the current Liberal-
Con servative  gov ernment  have










BG LT ES NL EE SE DK LU PL DE FR CZ HU BE FI IT LV SK SI RO AT IE PT EL MT CY UK
2000 2005 2009
Fiscal rule index
Source: European Commission (2011).
The stringency of fiscal rules in EU member states
2000, 2005 and 2009
Note: Points indicate the value of the index in 2000, 2005 and 2009. A higher value denotes a higher quality of 
rules-based fiscal governance. By comparing the score for different years, an indication of the evolution of the qua-
lity of fiscal governance can be obtained. Thus countries with long lines have introduced big changes in their fiscal 
rules. If the 2000 point is higher than the 2009 point, the fiscal rules index has decreased indicating a weakening of 








GRC ITA NOR BEL DNKDEU IRE ESP CHE AUT FRA ISL PRT CAN FIN NLDSWEAUS GBR USA NZL
Index
Source: Lassen (2010).
The Alt-Lassen index of fiscal transparency in OECD economies
Figure 4.7
24 See, for example, Molander and
Paulsson (2008).payments when the ceiling was threatened, meaning
that expenditure relating to one year was booked in
another year.25 However, these manipulations bore a
non-negligible political cost and have not resulted in a
trend towards a laxer adherence to the rules. 
There have also been some accommodating changes
in the pension rules. When, during the recent crisis,
the pension brake (see Section 4.3.2) implied that
pensions had to be cut, the rules for computing the
value of the pension system’s assets were changed so
that they were evaluated not at the end of the pre-
ceding year, but as a more favourable three-year
average. Tax cuts only for people above 65 were also
made to compensate pensioners for the cuts in pre-
tax pensions.26 Although the Swedish pension sys-
tem on paper is robust to demo-
graphic changes and growth
shocks, its long-run political
viability may thus be more un  -
certain.
More importantly, fiscal policy
has, however, adhered to the sur-
plus target of one percent of
GDP over a business cycle. Since
the target started to apply fully
in 2000 there has been one full
cycle according to Bergman
(2011), who used different meth-
ods to date the business cycle:
2000–2007(2008) if one mea-
sures from peak to peak and
2003–2009 if one measures from
trough to trough. From peak to
peak, average government net
lending was 1.3 (1.4) percent of
GDP and from trough to trough
1.2 percent. The results emerged
regardless of the government’s
practice of using a host of indi-
cators (see Section 4.3.2), which
could enable it to jump between
indicators when they show dif-
ferent outcomes.
It is also noteworthy that local
governments have adhered to the
balanced budget requirements
despite the fact that violations
trigger no sanctions. Figure 4.9
shows that the local government sector’s net lending
has varied around zero. This is important, as it has
been found that sovereign debt crises in many coun-
tries have been triggered by regional governments’ fis-
cal profligacy (Bordo et al. 2011).
The Swedish budget process and the “scope for reform”
The fiscal decision-making process may also be
important to the favourable fiscal outcomes. It is
based on an evaluation by the Ministry of Finance
of the so-called scope for reforms. This is defined as
the total sum of tax decreases and expenditure
increases which can be actively decided by the
Parliament and which are compatible with the target
that general government net lending should show a
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Note: There is a two-tier system of local governments: municipalities and counties. A few counties are 
amalgamated into regions. 
Sources: Ameco, National Institute for Economic Research in Sweden, own calculations.
Net lending of local governments in Sweden
Figure 4.9
25 Fiscal Policy Council (2009, 2010, 2011).
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surplus of one percent of GDP over a business
cycle.
Without discretionary tax and expenditure deci-
sions, the fiscal balance would gradually strengthen.
The explanation is as follows. Most taxes are pro-
portional to their tax bases. Tax revenues therefore
grow automatically at about the same pace as GDP.
In the absence of discretionary decisions, however,
government expenditure grows more slowly than
GDP. This is because only some expenditure, like
pensions and sickness benefits, are tied to wages
(which over time grow approximately at the same
rate as nominal GDP). Other expenditure, like cen-
tral government administration appropriations,
grows more slowly than wages: it follows wage
increases less expected productivity increases
(approximated by productivity increases in the pri-
vate sector). Some expenditure is indexed to the
CPI, which rises more slowly than wages. Much
expenditure, including, for example all central gov-
ernment grants to local governments, is not indexed
at all and thus falls in real terms when prices rise. As
a consequence, in the absence of discretionary deci-
sions on "new reforms", there is an annual improve-
ment in the structural fiscal balance of 0.5–0.6 per-
cent of GDP. Without active decisions, there is thus
a built-in surplus bias in the budget.27
The Ministry of Finance's estimate of the scope for
reform forms the basis for the government’s internal
budget negotiations. In recent years, the estimate has
also been accepted by the opposition parties, which
have kept their budget proposals within the limits of
the calculated scope for reforms.
The procedure with scope-for-reform calculations as a
basis for fiscal policy is likely to have contributed to
budget discipline. One way of looking at this proce-
dure is as a way of combining the two approaches to
dealing with the common-pool problem which have
been proposed in the research literature on deficit bias
(see Section 4.2.1): delegation of fiscal balance deci-
sions to a strong finance minister and the contract
approach whereby ministers and political parties
commit to budget discipline ex ante. 
The scope-for-reform calculations are also likely to
have framed budgetary decision-making in a way that
has facilitated a gradual reduction in government
expenditure and taxes relative to GDP (see
Figure 4.4). It is well-known from psychological
research that the framing of a decision problem often
has a major effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1981,
1986; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). A process
whereby discretionary budget decisions are based on
an estimate of the scope for reform makes it natural to
divide this scope between tax cuts and expenditure
rises. Since the scope for reform emerges because gov-
ernment expenditure in the absence of discretionary
decisions falls relative to GDP, the result is likely to be
a gradual decline in both taxes and public expenditure
in relation to GDP. 
4.4 The importance of output growth 
Discussions of fiscal performance naturally, as above,
tend to focus on fiscal policy and how it is influenced
by the fiscal framework. There is a risk, however, that
such an analysis attributes too large a role to fiscal
rules and transparency. Indeed, output growth is also
of paramount importance. There are two reasons for
this. Firstly, it is much less painful to improve the pri-
mary fiscal balance if the economy grows. Secondly,
given the primary fiscal balance and the real interest
rate, higher growth "dilutes" the debt-to-GDP ratio by
making the denominator increase faster.
This section first discusses output developments in
Sweden during the budget consolidation in the 1990s
and goes on to analyse the importance of higher long-
run growth during the whole period after the crisis in
the 1990s. 
4.4.1 Output growth during the fiscal consolidation in
the 1990s
Slow or negative output growth and high unemploy-
ment constitute major difficulties for euro area coun-
ties that are currently experiencing deep fiscal crises.
As a consequence, tax revenues are low and transfer
payments to the unemployed are high. It has been
claimed that, in such a situation, fiscal contractions
can be expansionary (for example, Giavazzi and
Pagano 1990, 1996 and Alesina and Perotti 1995).
Possible explanations are that long-term interest
rates fall because the credibility of fiscal sustainabil-
ity increases, that the risk of future and more chaot-
ic budget consolidations decreases and that very
large, future tax increases with huge distortionary
costs can be avoided if taxes are raised in the near
future. 
27 Fiscal Policy Council (2011) analyses how various factors con-
tribute to the scope for reform.Sweden managed to combine its tough fiscal consoli-
dation in the 1990s with high output growth.
Therefore, this episode has been cited as an example
of an expansionary fiscal contraction. This is proba-
bly an incorrect inference. Indeed, Bergman (2010)
could find no support for this hypothesis: instead he
concluded that contractionary fiscal policy also had
normal Keynesian demand-reducing effects during
this episode.28
A more plausible explanation of why Sweden could
combine fiscal consolidation with output growth is
the large real exchange rate depreciation that took
place (see Figure 4.10).29 Between 1991 and 1995
relative unit labour costs vis-à-vis EU-15 fell by as
much as 21 percent. This was caused by a large nom-
inal exchange rate depreciation.
The real exchange rate deprecia-
tion gave a boost to net exports
as can be seen in Figure 4.11.
The stimulus effects from in  -
creasing net exports (including
second-round multiplier effects
on private consumption) made it
possible for aggregate demand
and output to grow in
1994–2000, despite harsh fiscal
consolidation (reflected in the
diagram by the increases in gen-
eral government structural net
lending). 
In fact, Sweden provides a vivid
illustration of the importance of
swift real exchange rate depreci-
ations for economies caught up in a situation with
large fiscal deficits, low output growth and an appre-
ciated real exchange rate. Without a real exchange
rate depreciation, tax rises and government expendi-
ture cuts are bound to reduce aggregate demand and
output. Hence, tax revenues will fall and fiscal con-
solidation will be very slow. This is the current
predicament of the most crisis-ridden euro area
countries. They are not able, like Sweden in the
1990s, to achieve export-led growth in the short run,
since a real exchange rate depreciation within the
euro area requires a fall in labour costs, which can
only be achieved after a lengthy period of high
unemployment.
4.4.2 Longer-term output growth
Table 4.3 gives a longer term 
perspective on Swedish GDP
growth. Actual average GDP
growth per year after the 1990s
crisis until the recession in 2008
was 0.7 percentage points higher
than before the crisis: 3.0 percent
in 1995–2008 versus 2.3 percent
in 1970–1990. The difference is
accounted for by higher produc-
tivity growth after the 1990s 
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28 Hjelm (2002) reaches a similar conclu-
sion.
29 See Andersen (1994) and Barry and
FitzGerald (1999) for similar conclusions
regarding the fiscal contractions in
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crisis: 2.2 versus 1.4 percent.
Potential GDP growth was also
higher in 1995–2008 than in
1970–1990, but with a smaller
margin: 2.7 versus 2.4 percent.
Long-term growth in Sweden
after 1995 also compares
favourably with, for example, the
three largest euro area countries.
For France, Germany and Italy
(EU-3), average output growth
was more than one percentage
point lower in 1995–2008 than in
1970–1990.
Higher output growth facilitates fiscal consolidation
in two ways:
1. By raising the denominator in the debt-to-GDP
ratio at a faster pace, government debt is "diluted".
Ceteris paribus (with given paths for the primary
deficit and the real rate of interest), higher GDP
growth reduces the government debt-to-GDP
ratio. Over time the effects can be sizable, as illus-
trated by Table 4.4. The ceteris paribus effect of the
higher real growth in Sweden in 1994–2007 than in
1970–1993 (at given paths for the primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio and the real rate of interest) was a
reduction in the consolidated government gross
debt ratio of 13 percentage points: from 70.0 per-
cent of GDP to 57.0 percent of GDP. A compari-
son with the average growth in EU-3 (France,
Germany and Italy) in 1994–2007 gives almost the
same effect.30
2. More importantly, higher
output growth makes it easier
to improve the primary fiscal
balance. As discussed in Sec  -
tion 4.3.3, in the absence of
discretionary fiscal decisions
the fiscal balance strengthens
with output growth as taxes
are more or less proportional
to GDP, whereas government
expenditure does not auto-
matically follow GDP. In gen-
eral, fiscal consolidation be  comes politically less
controversial with strong output growth, as it is
easier to combine a strengthening of the fiscal bal-
ance with higher real disposable incomes and pri-
vate consumption.
The relatively fast output growth in Sweden after 1994
has been the subject of much discussion. Although the
large currency depreciation in 1992 started off a
process with higher growth, it cannot possibly have had
effects that lasted for at least a fifteen-year period. In
the twenty-year period prior to the floating of the
Swedish krona in 1992 there were several devaluations
which all failed to trigger such a process. Instead, the
Swedish economy was then caught in a devaluation
cycle, whereby each devaluation triggered a few years of
high growth until wages caught up again and then over-
shot, leading to a real appreciation, which had to be
corrected through a new devaluation.
Table 4.3  
Average growth rates in percent 
  GDP Potential  GDP  GDP/hour 
Sweden     
1970–1990 2.3  2.4  1.4 
1995–2008 3.0  2.7  2.2 
      
EU-3     
1970–1990 3.0  2.9  2.1 
1995–2008 1.7  1.6  1.4 
Note: EU-3 is a weighted average for France, Germany and Italy. T




Direct contribution of higher growth to decreases in Sweden's  
government debt-to-GDP ratio in 1994–2007 
Fall in debt-to-GDP ratio  
Cumulated contribution from higher growth than in  
1970–1993  13.0 
Cumulated contribution from higher growth than in EU-3 
1994–2007  13.1 
Note: The government debt ratio is the ratio of consolidated govern-
ment gross debt to GDP. Absent stock-flow adjustments and valuation 
changes,  the  change  in  the  government  debt-to-GDP  ratio  is
 ݀௧ െ݀௧ିଵ ൌ݌ ௧ ൅ሺ ݎ ௧ െ݃௧ሻ݀௧ିଵ, where d is the government debt 
ratio, p is the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio, r is the real rate of interest 
and g is the real GDP growth rate. The entries in the table give the 
accumulated contribution to the decrease in the debt ratio from higher 
growth  than  in  the  reference  period,  i.e.  σሺ ݃௧ െ݃ ҧሻ ଶ଴଴଻
ଵଽଽସ ݀௧ିଵ,  where
݃ҧ is the average growth rate in Sweden in the reference period or in 
EU-3 (France, Germany and Italy) in 1994–2007. 
Sources: AMECO, own calculations. 
30 In general it holds that: Change in the
Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio =
Primary Deficit-to-GDP Ratio + (Real
Interest Rate – Real Growth Rate) ×
Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio +
Residual. The residual captures, for exam-
ple, valuation changes in shares held by
the government and sales of such shares.
The residual is often referred to as stock-
flow adjustments.To understand the long period of favourable growth
after 1992, one instead has to look at other factors. A
number of such factors have been identified (see, for
example, EEAG 2007, Chapter 4):
￿ Schumpetarian  creative destruction during the
1991–1993 crisis, which led to the close-down of
many stagnating firms and freed up labour and
capital for use in firms with a potential for long-
run expansion.
￿ Comprehensive tax reform in 1990–1991, which
broadened tax bases and reduced marginal tax
rates, thus creating a socially more efficient tax sys-
tem. Although there were subsequently a number
of amendments to the system, which in some cases
violated the basic principles behind the reforms,
the reformed system has on the whole survived
(Fiscal Policy Council 2011). 
￿ Extensive product market deregulation, which took
place mainly in the first half of the 1990s, was ear-
lier than in most continental European economies.
The deregulations encompassed in particularly
important network industries such as rail trans-
port, taxi services, domestic air traffic, postal ser-
vices, telecommunications, and electricity genera-
tion and distribution.
￿ A high level of R&D expenditure: the ratio of R&D
expenditure to GDP (around 4 percent) has been
the highest in the European Union.
￿ Reforms of the wage bargaining system: In the
1980s, the centralised wage bargaining system,
which had earlier delivered aggregate real wage
restraint, but also compressed wage differentials,
began to crumble. In the late 1990s, more co-ordi-
nated wage bargaining, contributing to wage
restraint, was reintroduced. However, the co-ordi-
nation is now more informal and permits greater
individual wage flexibility, allowing the individual's
wage to be better linked to her productivity
(EEAG 2004, Chapter 3).
￿ For historical reasons, such as the strong position
of Ericsson in the telecom industry, Sweden may
have been well placed to take advantage of the
growth potential associated with IT.
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, there have recently also
been fundamental labour market reforms (less gener-
ous unemployment insurance, sickness insurance and
early retirement, as well as the introduction of an
earned income tax credit) aimed at raising aggregate
employment. Yet such reforms were not made until in
2007 and cannot account for growth developments
before that year.
The relative importance of various factors that may
explain the favourable Swedish growth record after
the 1990s crisis is not clear. Our discussion neverthe-
less highlights the potential importance of growth-
enhancing reforms for fiscal performance in general.
4.5 Conclusions
Our discussion has emphasised two sets of explana-
tions for Sweden's strong fiscal performance in recent
years:
1. A strict fiscal framework and a broad political
consensus on the merits of fiscal discipline.
2. High output growth, which has reduced the costs
of fiscal discipline.
There is an effective fiscal framework in Sweden with
a fiscal balance (surplus) target, a government expen-
diture ceiling and a top-down approach for bud-
getary decisions. However, there are no strong com-
mitment devices or sanction mechanisms in the case
of violations of the rules. There are no stipulations
that past deviations from the fiscal balance target
must be compensated for in the future, as is the case
with the Swiss and German debt brakes and is now
envisaged in the new EU fiscal compact. Instead, the
system relies to a large extent on a high degree of fis-
cal transparency. This includes relevant follow-ups of
the attainment of fiscal targets and long-run sustain-
ability calculations provided by the government, as
well as monitoring of fiscal policy by several inde-
pendent or semi-independent bodies. All this impos-
es high reputation costs on governments that renege
on their own targets and gives voters access to good
information on fiscal policy.
It is not obvious why this system works. One possible
explanation is that economists in Sweden have tradi-
tionally enjoyed high status and are listened to in the
public debate. This means that criticism of govern-
ment policy by economists probably has a greater
impact than in most other countries. 
There is probably also a deep respect for rules in
Swedish society in general, which contrasts starkly
with the situation in Greece and some other South
European countries. This is illustrated by the fact that
the risk of being subjected to sanctions in the case of
monetary union membership played an important
role in the Swedish discussion on whether or not to
join. It was never seen as an option that the three-per-
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cent-of-GDP deficit ceiling stipulated in the stability
pact would be violated. Instead, before the referen-
dum on membership of the monetary union (which
resulted in a “no” to the euro) in 2003, a government
commission looked into the requirements of fiscal
policy that would be imposed by switching to the euro
(Commission on Stabilisation Policy 2002). The com-
mission concluded that the surplus target should be
raised in the event of membership of the monetary
union to minimise the risk that the deficit ceiling
would be breached in a cyclical downturn. This re  -
commendation was based on an analysis of the prob-
abilities that the stability pact’s deficit ceiling would
be breached under assumptions of different fiscal bal-
ance targets (Ohlsson 2002). To our knowledge, there
was no similar discussion before the adoption of the
euro in Greece, for example.
Sweden's current government has used a desire to
avoid breaching the EU deficit ceiling in downturns
as an argument for maintaining the surplus target
of one percent of GDP over a business cycle,
although Sweden is not a member of the monetary
union and thus cannot be exposed to fines (Budget
Bill 2011).
A difficult question is to what extent Sweden's
recent favourable fiscal performance depends on
the fiscal framework in place, and to what extent its
fiscal performance (as well as its fiscal framework)
are consequences of the political consensus on fis-
cal discipline that emerged in the wake of the 1990s
crisis. It is important not to give too much credit
for this performance to the new fiscal framework
and too little to the change in mind-set that may
also have manifested itself in the absence of frame-
work reforms (at least as long as the earlier crisis is
fresh in the public's memory). The lessons learned
during the crisis in the 1990s were probably neces-
sary for the successful implementation of the
stricter fiscal framework. At the same time, the
rules may have helped create an institutionalised
memory that fades more slowly than the purely
political memory. 
Our discussion emphasises that good fiscal perfor-
mance does not depend only on decisions in the fis-
cal sphere. Macroeconomic conditions are also of
crucial importance. Fiscal discipline is much easier
to achieve with high output growth than with a stag-
nating economy. This holds true both in the long run
and in the short run and is vividly illustrated by the
case of Sweden. Higher growth than achieved previ-
ously or in the large EU economies after 1994 helped
to create a downward trend in the government debt-
to-GDP ratio. Budget consolidation in the 1990s was
greatly facilitated by a large real exchange rate
depreciation that boosted both net exports and out-
put. The real exchange rate depreciation was
achieved through a large currency depreciation, an
option not available to countries like Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain vis-à-vis the other
euro area countries. 
To sum up, Swedish fiscal experiences suggest the fol-
lowing lessons: 
￿ A deep fiscal crisis may help to forge a broad con-
sensus on the merits of budget discipline with
long-lasting effects.
￿ Well-defined fiscal objectives, fiscal transparency
and a qualified economic-policy debate may be
more important to fiscal discipline than binding
rules and automatic correction mechanisms.
￿ The framing of the budget decisions, particularly a
well-defined process for evaluating the scope for
active tax and expenditure decisions, may be of
great importance.
￿ Fiscal sustainability does not only depend on
decisions taken within the fiscal sphere. High
output growth greatly facilitates fiscal consolida-
tion. In the long run this requires growth-
enhancing reforms. In the short run, the ability to
achieve large real exchange rate depreciation,
stimulating net exports, is of paramount impor-
tance to open economies with serious competi-
tiveness problems.
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